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WHY PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
MATTERS FOR SOFTWARE†
BRIAN J. LOVE
81 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO (forthcoming)
It’s not hard to see why many think software patents are a scourage.
Studies suggest that they encourage very little innovation,1 impose a great
deal of cost on innocent technology companies,2 and are almost
singlehandedly responsible for the existence of patent trolls.3 After half a
decade of appellate litigation aimed at curtailing the patentability of codebased inventions, however, foes of software patents have little to show for
their efforts beyond a largely meaningless Supreme Court opinion4 and a
†
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1
See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262, 1290 (2010) (finding in a
survey of start-up companies that (i) first mover advantage, not patent protection, was the most
“important” means to “capture competitive advantage” in the software industry, and (ii) that the
majority of start-up companies in the software industry hold no patents at all). Consider also that the
software industry flourished in the late 1980s and early 1990s despite the fact that software was not
clearly patentable until later in the decade. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1618-19 (2003).
2
In an event study of accused infringers’ stock prices following suit, Bessen et al. found that the
average NPE suit cost accused infringers $122 million. James Bessen et al., The Private and Social
Costs of Patent Trolls, at *15, Tbl. 2 (Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-45, at
*15 (Sep. 19, 2011). Over the last twenty years, the aggregate wealth lost to NPE suits is
approximately $500 billion. Id. at *16. Also, allegations of copying are quite rare in patent suits,
particularly those enforcing high-tech patents. See infra note 32.
3
In a recent empirical study, I found that roughly roughly 65% of NPE patent assertions were brought
to enforce a software patent and 80% were brought to enforce a high-tech patent. Brian J. Love, An
Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls without
Harming Innovators?, at *39 (working paper). Similarly, Bessen et al. found that 62% of patents
litigated by NPEs between 1990 and 2010 were “software patents” and 75% covered “computer and
communications technology.” Bessen et al., supra, at *12.
4
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation
test” as the sole test for abstractness, but failing to provide an alternative test); see, e.g., Larry Downes,
Bilski: One Last Tilt at the IP Windmills, The Technology Liberation Front (June 29, 2010), at
http://techliberation.com/2010/06/29/bilski-one-last-tilt-at-the-ip-windmills/ (“[Bilski] basically did
nothing to change patent law or to settle enormous and mushrooming uncertainties, both for business
methods and, more generally, for software applications.”).
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slew of inconsistent rulings at the Federal Circuit.5
But, all may not be lost just yet. Summarily vacated and remanded by
the Supreme Court on May 21, Ultramercial v. Hulu6 may be the high tech
industry’s last best chance to convince the Federal Circuit to meaningfully
limit the scope of patentable subject matter for software business methods.
By remanding Ultramercial, a case concerning web-based advertising
technology, for reconsideration in light of its recent opinion in Mayo v.
Prometheus,7 the Supreme Court tipped its hand to the possibility that the
reasoning it used to deny patent rights for a medical diagnostic test in
Mayo may have broad application beyond the sphere of medicine and
biotechnology—a glimmer of hope for those hoping to see the thicket of
software patents trimmed, if not yanked out by the roots.
Rather than opine on the boundary of patentability for software or
propose a new test based on dicta from Mayo, both issues about which
much ink has been and will be spilled by other scholars,8 this Essay takes a
step back and asks: why are we fighting about patentable subject matter
for software in the first place? The answer is straightforward, but it is one
that courts applying—and commentators arguing for—broad subject
matter rules seem to have forgotten.
Patentable subject matter matters not because it is the ideal solution to
the ills of software patents—it isn’t9—or easy to apply—it isn’t that
either.10 Rather, patentable subject matter matters because it is virtually
the only defensive mechanism left for repeat victims of software patent
hold-up.11
Compare Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated & rem’d No. 11962, – S.Ct – (May 21, 2012) (finding the claims at issue not abstract because they included an “over
the Internet” limitation and, thus, “likely require intricate and complex computer programming”) with
DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the claims at issue too
abstract, despite the inclusion of a “computer-aided” limitation, because they are “silent as to how a
computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of the
computer to the performance of the method”).
6
Ultramercial, 657 F.3d 1323, vacated & rem’d No. 11-962, – S.Ct – (May 21, 2012).
7
132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).
8
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); Bernard Chao,
Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
9
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent
Doctrine Decisionmaking, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1691 (2011) (arguing that regularly
applying section 101 is inefficient because doing so, inter alia, increases “the total cost of deciding
validity issues” and decreases “respect for patent tribunals”).
10
See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (referring to
section 101 as a “swamp of verbiage” and “murky morass”).
11
HP, Apple, Samsung, AT&T, Sony, Dell, Motorola, and Amazon were each sued by NPEs thirty or
more
times
in
2011
alone.
PatentFreedom,
Most
Pursued
Companies,
at
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/pursued/. Nine more technology companies were sued
twenty or more times. Id. For more on the causes and effects of “patent holdup,” see Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007). To be clear,
Ultramercial is not a non-practicing entity; it sells web-based advertising services and did business
5
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I. Section 101 is a frustrating “murky morass”
Increasingly, courts and commentators weary from years of arguing
about the scope of patentable subject matter for software patents seem
ready to throw in the towel. Rather than continue efforts to craft a test for
determining when a software invention graduates from an “abstract idea”
or mere algorithm into a patentable invention, some now dismiss
arguments for excluding claims under section 10112 as attacks more
properly made under sections 102,13 103,14 and 11215.16
Chief Judge Rader’s opinion in Ultramercial, the very case the Federal
Circuit must now reconsider, is a prime example of this shift. The case

with WildTangent prior to filing suit. Ultramercial LLC & Ultramercial, Inc., Br. in Opp. to Pet.
Cert.,WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial LLC, No. 11-962 (April 30, 2012).
12
35 U.S.C. § 101 (defining patent-eligible subject matter as “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”). As interpreted by courts, section 101 excludes

from the scope of patentable subject matter “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.” See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
13
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (denying patent rights for inventions that lack novelty). The America
Invents Act amends 35 U.S.C. § 102 to establish a first-to-file patent system. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011). This provision
will go into effect eighteen months after September 16, 2011, the date the Act was enacted. See §
3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
14
35 U.S.C. § 103 (denying patent rights for inventions that “as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art”).
15
35 U.S.C. § 112 (denying patent rights for inventions that lack “a written description of the
invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art. . . to make and use the same”).
16

See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d at 1326-29 (described in detail infra); Research Corp.
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that “[t]he section 101
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test” and “that section 101 eligibility should not become a
substitute for a patentability analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions”
of patentability); see also MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding that courts may require litigants to address a patent’s validity under sections 102, 103, and
112 before reaching section 101 because doing so would avoid “the murky morass that is § 101
jurisprudence” and “would make patent litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring
a degree of certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the marketplace”). This
line of Federal Circuit precedent appears to derive from one phrase in Justice Stevens’ concurrence in
Bilski. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that in crafting a test for
abstractness there is “a risk of merely . . . seeing common attributes that track the familiar issues of
novelty and obviousness that arise under other sections of the statute but are not relevant to § 101”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Some scholars agree. See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008)
(arguing that section 101 should be adandoned altogether as a check on patentability); Kristen Osenga,
Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1087 (2007) (arguing that
rejecting software patents under section 101 is like “trying to kill an ant with an elephant gun” and in
really a“mere[] prox[y] for . . . other statutory patentability requirements”). Cf. Crouch & Merges,
supra note 9, at 1674 (arguing that patents’ validity should be subject first to sections 102, 103, and
112, and only as a last resort to section 101, in order to “minimiz[e] the cost and confusion that
accompany a review of patents for § 101 subject-matter eligibility”).
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involves a patent “disclos[ing] a method for allowing Internet users to
view copyrighted material free of charge in exchange for watching certain
advertisements.”17 Reversing a decision by the Central District of
Californa holding the claimed invention too abstract for patent
protection,18 the Federal Circuit downplayed patentable subject matter as
nothing more than a “coarse eligibility filter”—a simple, easily-met
“threshold check.”19 Indeed, in concluding that the district court erred, the
Federal Circuit did not apply the “machine or transformation test,” or any
test for that matter, to probe the patent’s abstract nature. Rather, the court
suggested the invention’s patentworthyness under section 101 was readily
apparent because the patent claims at issue indirectly “invoke[] computers
and applications of computer technology” that “likely,” but certainly not
expressly, “require intricate and complex computer programming” and an
“extensive computer interface” to implement.20
Though not necessarily unsympathetic to the accused infringers’
arguments that the “broadly claimed method in the . . . patent does not
specify a particular mechanism” for carrying out the claimed functionality,
the court replied that “[t]his breadth and lack of specificity does not render
the claimed subject matter impermissibly abstract.”21 Instead, the court
stressed that it is the “substantive conditions of patentability”22—namely,
“novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure”23—upon which
“claim patentability ultimately depends.”24 No fewer than five times in six
pages, the court distinguished section 101 and patentable subject matter
from “the substantive criteria set forth in § 102, § 103, and § 112.”25
The implication seems clear: accused infringers relying on section 101
to invalidate a sweepingly broad software patent are barking up the wrong
tree. Rather than arguing such patents are outside the bounds of patentable
subject matter, the court implores defendants instead to rely on the
remaining checks on patentability and, in the court’s words, bring

17

Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. 09-CV-6918, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13,
2010), rev’d 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
18
The Central District of California dismissed Ultramercial’s infringement claims on the grounds that
its patent covered an “abstract idea” and thus failed to qualify as patentable subject matter under the
Supreme Court’s then-brand new opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Applying the
“machine or transformation test,” the district court ruled that Ultramercial’s patent recited neither a
machine nor a transformation because “the Internet is not a machine” and “the mere transfer of data
from one memory disk on one computer to another memory space in a second computer is not
‘transformation of article.’” 2010 WL 3360098, at *4-5.
19
657 F.3d at 1326.
20
Id. at 1328.
21
Id. at 1329.
22
Id. at 1326 (quoting Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1064
(Fed.Cir.2011)).
23
Id. at 1326.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1324-30.
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“challenges that the claimed invention does not advance technology
(novelty), does not advance technology sufficiently to warrant patent
protection (obviousness), or does not sufficiently enable, describe, and
disclose the limits of the invention (adequate disclosure).”26
Sounds reasonable, right? Claim overbreadth is at the core of all four
doctrines. Broad claims risk overlapping abstract ideas, just like they risk
overlapping old ideas or new ideas the patentee did not foresee at the time
of filing.27 If the boundary between patentable software and abstraction is
hard to define and hard for courts to apply, why bother at all when accused
infringers have, as the Federal Circuit puts it, other “powerful tools to
weed out” deficient patents?28
II. But sections 102, 103, and 112 aren’t adequate alternatives
The problem, and what the court and some commentators fail to
acknowledge, is that companies accused of infringing software patents
have resorted to section 101 challenges precisely because the traditional
checks on patentability found in 102, 103, and 112 (those “powerful tools”
the court mentioned) have proven woefully ineffective at screening
overbroad software patents from the pool.
As safeguards against overbroad claims, the novelty, nonobviousness,
and enablement requirements are, among all arts, least effective with
respect to software. Take enablement—the patentability requirement
tasked with ensuring that prospective patentees disclosure enough to the
public to allow those working in the art to make and use the invention. In
the context of software, enablement is all but trivial because, as a matter of
law, a person with ordinary skill in the art of software is a capable
computer programmer.29 Thus, quixotically, the “inventor” of a softwarebased invention never has to code anything to get a patent.30 In fact, he
doesn’t even have to know how to code himself.31 He can simply describe

26

Id. at 1328.
See, e.g., Crouch & Merges, supra note 9, at 1674 (“[T]he policy underpinnings of various
requirements overlap in complex ways, so that in reality patentability doctrine does not test for a series
of discrete and independent qualities that are distinct from and mutually exclusive of each other.”).
28
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
29
Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]riting code for . . .
software is within the skill of the art . . . .”); AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504
F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In software cases, . . . algorithms in the specification need only
disclose adequate defining structure to render the bounds of the claim understandable to one of
ordinary skill in the art.”).
30
Under the doctrine of “constructive reduction to practice,” a purported inventor can apply for a
patent without first building a working model. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d
1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Moreover, software patent applicants need not submit source code to the
PTO to satisfy the best mode requirement. Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1549.
31
See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435–36 (1911) (“[H]ow can it
27
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in broad terms what he might have coded and leave it up to the public—
namely unwary independent inventors—to do the actual work.32
The novelty and nonobviousness requirements are also rather
ineffective at derailing questionable software patent applications because
applying these doctrines requires the identification of specific pieces of
prior-art. In fact, blackletter patent law in this area is so tied to analysis of
particular prior art references that the Federal Circuit actually forbids
district judges from relying on anything else, including simple common
sense. Just last month, the Federal Circuit drove home the point by
reversing a judge who “clearly erred” by using a “common sense
approach” when considering obviousness.33
The prohibition on common sense aside, the fact that novelty and
nonobviousness determination must rest on particular pieces of prior art is
a problem in the software world predominantly because it is so difficult to
locate software prior art. The PTO is ill equipped to locate prior art in
fields that evolve quickly and fields that fall outside established, organized
research communities.34 Software, unfortunately, is both. PTO examiners
most often locate prior art in databases of issued patents. But, there will
be few if any patents issued in fields like software, where products churn
faster than patents issue.35 Worse, when an invention relates to an area
that falls outside the interests of the established research community—like
software, finance, and e-commerce do—what little prior art exists is
unlikely to have ever been published in printed form at all.36 Given the
take from [an inventor’s] merit that he may not know all of the forces which he has brought into
operation? It is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able to state the scientific principles
underlying his invention . . . .”).
32
Allegations of copying are rare in patent litigation, especially in cases involving high-tech patents.
See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1424
(2009).
33
Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., No. 2010-1341, 2012 WL 1940157, at *8 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 2012).
34
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 43 (2001) (“The patent system presumes a finite, comprehensively indexed technical
literature and relies on individual examiners to . . . search the relevant subliteratures.”); Note,
Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving Patent Administration Through Prosecution History
Estoppel, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2171 (2003) (“Although emerging technologies, by definition,
contain less prior art, the PTO often misses entirely the prior art that does exist . . . . because it lacks
the resources or the expertise to keep up in a rapidly changing field.”).
35
Computing power doubles roughly every two years, Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More
Components Onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115 (predicting this trend,
now referred to as “Moore’s Law”), while patent applications spend an average of about three years at
the PTO before issuing as patents, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of
the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002). See also Estopping the Madness,
supra, at 2171 (“For emerging technologies, a search through a database of existing patents will yield
very little prior art.”).
36
Estopping the Madness, supra, at 2171 (“[S]oftware innovations . . . may be documented only via
developer specifications or online FAQs. Frequently, the source code itself is never released at all.”);
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diffuse nature of prior art in these fields and the time pressure examiners
feel to slog through an increasing backlog of applications,37 PTO
examiners have little shot at accurately assessing the novelty and
nonobviousness of software patent applications, and thus allow many
overbroad software applications to issue as patents.
Moreover, the realities of patent litigation ensure that these mistakes
generally go uncorrected in court when overbroad software patents are
asserted. Though it is true that, once a patent is litigated, accused
infringers can pay for extensive prior art searches to locate art the PTO
could not, much software prior art is never memorialized in a permanent
or even semi-permanent way and may no longer be available years after
the patent issues. Further, even when new art is located, the Patent Act
requires courts and juries to assume issued patents are valid.38 As
interpreted by courts, this means that post-issue invalidity must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence, making the the bar for invalidity ex post
far higher than it was ex ante at the PTO.39 The cumulative effect is a
double shield against invalidity: PTO examiners have wide discretion to
deny rights but lack the ability to find strong prior art; judges and juries
have better art but must subject it to a far higher level of scrutiny.40
Finally, all of this is compounded by the fact that some software
patentees are satisfied simply by the ability to file a complaint, regardless
of their patent’s ability to withstand motions practice or trial. Because
patent litigation defense costs are extremely high, patentees can often
negotiate sizeable settlements simply by offering to settle for less than the

Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents:Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 253, 279-80 (2000) (“Commercial business models of the type that are being applied to
the Internet, are likely, if anything, to be less well documented than financial methods. There simply is
no real scientific literature on business models.”).
37
On average, a patent examiner will spend just 18 hours total on each application he reviews. See
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001). At
the close of 2009, the PTO employed just over 6,000 examiners and faced a backlog of more than
700,000 applications awaiting their first office action. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent
Inventory Statistics--FY09 (2009), at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp.
38
35 U.S.C. § 282 (“[A] patent shall be presumed valid” and “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of
a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (reaffirming that “§ 282 requires an invalidity defense to be
proved by clear and convincing evidence”).
39
See Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 45, 51–52, 61 (2007).
40
See Hon. William Alsup, Memo to Congress: A District Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform:
Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Calibratiung Deference to the Strength of the
Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1648 (2009) (“This presumption of validity applies
equally to all patents—even those that are almost certainly invalid. This is . . . often an unfair
advantage, given the ease with which applicants and their agents can sneak undeserving claims
through the PTO. Because of the burnish of this presumption, patentees can use a weak, arguably
invalid patent, to force an accused infringer through years of litigation.”).
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amount it would cost the accused infringer in attorneys’ fees to fight
through discovery and win on a motion or at trial.41 Companies accused of
infringing software patents actually do pretty well in front of juries
(which, unlike district judges, can use common sense when deciding
whether to invalidate a patent—or, rather, can do so without leaving
behind a paper trail that could be used as a basis for appeal).42 However,
this fact is of little consolation to defendants in many patent suits,
particularly suits brought by established non-practicing entities who own
patents so broad they can sue dozens of companies, if not an entire
industry, without risking sanctions. A good shot at invalidating a patent at
trial is largely irrelevant if it costs $2 million to get before a jury and the
patentee is willing to settle for $500,000.
III. That’s why section 101 matters
What repeat victims of hold-up crave is a mechanism that (1) can
keep as many broad software patents as possible from leaving the PTO in
the first place; and (2) they can use to attack broad software patents that
slip through the cracks before trial with an early motion. Because it is a
purely philosophical endeavor not tied to prior art or a factual inquiry, a
patentable subject matter challenge fits the bill. This is why patentable
subject matter matters to those in the high tech industry.
It was only after finding themselves with nowhere else to turn that
accused infringers gradually began to resort to section 101 for protection.
Though software first clearly became patentable in 1998,43 challenges on
the basis of patentable subject matter were laregely unheard of prior to
2007, when Bilski first landed at the Federal Circuit.44 In short,
41

See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, ALABAMA
L. REV., at *37-38 (forthcoming 2012) (noting NPE patents that are “enforced against an entire
industry, or alternatively against a slew of defendants in a single lawsuit” with the strategy to “propose
settlement amounts which are lower, often far lower, than the amount which it will cost an accused
infringer to defend itself,” often “in the range of $100,000 or $250,000, even though the cost of
litigating the case for an accused infringer would be close to one million dollars per year”).
42
See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among
Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 680, 692, 695–96 (2011) (studying patents litigated eight or
more times and finding that (1) suits enforcing such patents are successful only 10.7% of the time
when litigated to a final resolution, (2) 63.5% of such patents are owned by non-practicing entities, and
(3) 74.1% of such patents are software-related).
43
State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (eliminating the “business method exception” to patentable subject matter and holding that
software is patentable provided it “constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation” by “produc[ing]s ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’”).
44
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 399 n.83 (2012)
(finding that “[p]arties (or amici) in just twelve appeals raised 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a defense between
2001 and the time In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008), reached the Federal Circuit in early 2007”);
Lemley, et al., supra note 8, at 1318 (“For a decade after 1998, patentable subject matter was
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dissatisfied with enablement, novelty, and nonobviousness, the high tech
industry eventually settled on patentable subject matter as the least bad
option available.
If the Federal Circuit is tired of philosophizing about patentable subject
matter, it has no one to blame but itself. It is precisely because three
decades of case law have made the remaining checks on patentability so
weak that courts, patentees, and accused infringers now find themselves
working to draw a workable line in the sand between patentable software
and abstract ideas.45 For courts now to imply otherwise—i.e., that accused
infringers rely on patentable subject matter when they have better options
to pursue—suggests the onset of a surprisingly sudden case of institutional
amnesia. And, perhaps, one that reflects more of a desire to avoid the
tough job of charting the coastline of patentability than to promote
innovation.
Courts that find patentable subject matter frustrating can do better.
Short of giving section 101 a new set of teeth, tweaking the standards for
novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement so that they acknowledge the
realities of innovation in the software industry would be an excellent start.

effectively a dead letter.”).
45
In fairness to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has not been very helpful either. Like its
opinion in Bilski, the Court’s foray into obviousness jurisprudence in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
raised more questions than it answered. 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test as the sole test for obviousness, but failing to propose an
alternative).
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